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JUSTIFICATION FOR CREATING AN 
OMBUDSMAN PRIVILEGE IN TODAY’S 
SOCIETY 
Due to ever-increasing court congestion and contemporary policy 
favoring the resolution of disputes outside the courtroom, now more than 
ever a privilege for communications with an ombudsman is needed.  
Although statistics demonstrate that an ombudsman can quickly and 
effectively resolve disputes, courts have been inconsistent in recognizing 
such a privilege.  This failure to consistently recognize a privilege for 
communications with an ombudsman places practicing ombudsmen in a 
catch-22.  Ombudsmen are left to decide between disregarding standards 
of practice they have sworn to follow, most notably that ombudsmen keep 
communications in confidence, on the one hand, or of violating a court 
order requiring disclosure of the communications made to the 
ombudsman, on the other.  Recognizing an ombudsman privilege will 
eliminate this dilemma without unduly impeding access to evidence, as an 
ombudsman privilege is merely a different embodiment of privileges and 
rules of evidence already in effect. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Today court congestion continues to escalate, and as a result 
alternate methods for resolving disputes have become increasingly 
widespread.1  One of these alternative dispute resolution techniques that 
has been implemented in organizations ranging from private businesses 
to governmental and education institutions is the use of ombudsmen.2  
An ombudsman is a neutral member of an organization who receives 
complaints from employees inside the organization, as well as third 
parties external to the organization, and attempts to resolve these 
complaints through various dispute resolution methods.3 
Statistics show that use of an ombudsman within an organization 
may help to not only effectively solve the inevitable disputes that 
frequently arise, but also help to prevent unethical conduct within the 
organization.4  However, these significant benefits that an ombudsman 
may provide to an organization hinge on the guarantee to complainants 
that the communications with the ombudsman will be kept confidential.5  
Without a guarantee of confidentiality an ombudsman cannot function 
effectively because complainants will be hesitant to come forward with 
issues regarding the organization for fear of retaliation.6 
The centrality that confidentiality plays in the ombudsman process is 
embodied by the numerous standards of practice that have been 
promulgated to regulate practicing ombudsmen, which require 
ombudsmen keep nearly all communications with a complainant 
confidential.7  Despite the ombudsman’s duty under these standards of 
 
1. See infra Part II. 
2. See infra Part II.C. 
3. See infra Part II.A. 
4. See infra Part II.C. 
5. See infra Part III. 
6. See infra Part III.A. 
7. The International Ombudsman Association (IOA) standards require an ombudsman 
to   “hold[]   all   communications   with   those   seeking   assistance   in   strict   confidence  
and take[] all reasonable steps to safeguard confidentiality . . . .”  IOA STANDARDS OF 
PRACTICE § 3.1 (Int’l Ombudsman Ass’n 2009), available at http://www.ombudsassociation.or
g/sites/default/files/IOA_Standards_of_Practice_Oct09.pdf.  Similarly, the United States 
Ombudsman Association places the discretion to disclose information with the ombudsman 
and requires an ombudsman “not [to] reveal information when confidentiality has been 
promised.” GOVERNMENTAL OMBUDSMAN STANDARDS §§ I(C), II(A)(8)(d), II(C)(1)–
(2) (U.S. Ombudsman Ass’n 2003), available at http://www.usombudsman.org/documents/PD
F/References/USOA_STANDARDS.pdf.  Importantly, both standards plainly state the 
ombudsman should not be compelled to testify.  Id. § II(C)(3); IOA STANDARDS OF 
PRACTICE, supra, § 3.3. 
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practice to maintain the confidence of a complainant’s communications, 
courts have recently held that these communications are not privileged; 
therefore, disclosure may be compelled.8  When a court allows discovery 
of communications with an ombudsman it leaves the ombudsman with 
the choice of either violating the court’s order or violating the standards 
of practice the ombudsman has sworn to abide by.9 
Therefore, it is essential that a privilege be granted for 
communications with an ombudsman as confidentiality is vital to the 
ombudsman process.  Indeed, this process provides a critically important 
alternate route to litigation in contemporary times of increasingly 
congested court dockets, but yet courts have recently put practicing 
ombudsmen in the challenging position of choosing between violating a 
court order for disclosure or violating their standards of practice.10  
Furthermore, granting an ombudsman privilege would both be 
exceptionally similar to the current recognized mediation privilege, and 
it would also further the increasingly important policy of settling 
disputes outside of court.11 
Prior writings discuss the importance of an ombudsman privilege.  
This comment will build upon several of these works,12 beginning in Part 
II by discussing the benefits of using an ombudsman and provide 
statistics on general use of ombudsmen in various organizations.13  Next, 
Part III will explain the critical role confidentiality plays in the effective 
use of an ombudsman.14  Then, Part IV will consider the differing views 
courts have taken on an ombudsman privilege over the years, as well as 
where the law stands today and what a practicing ombudsman can do to 
increase the chances that complainant communications are kept 
confidential.15  Finally, Part V will explore the similarities between an 
 
8. See infra Part IV.C. 
9. See infra Part IV.C. 
10. See infra Part IV.C. 
11. See infra Part V. 
12. See Christina M. Kuta, Comment, Universities, Corporations, and States Use Them—
Now It’s Time to Protect Them: An Analysis of the Public and Private Sector Ombudsman and 
the Continued Need for a Privileged Relationship, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 389 (2003); Scott C. Van 
Soye, Illusory Ethics: Legal Barriers to an Ombudsman’s Compliance with Accepted Ethical 
Standards, 8 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 117 (2007); Brenda V. Thompson, Comment, Corporate 
Ombudsmen and Privileged Communications: Should Employee Communications to 
Corporate Ombudsmen Be Entitled to Privilege?, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 653 (1992). 
13. See infra Part II. 
14. See infra Part III. 
15. See infra Part IV. 
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ombudsman privilege and the widely accepted mediation privilege as 
well as the similar policy shared by an ombudsman privilege that is 
behind Federal Rule of Evidence 408 to demonstrate that creating an 
ombudsman privilege is nothing more than the next logical step in 
today’s society.16 
II.  USE OF AN OMBUDSMAN TO PREVENT MISCONDUCT AND 
EFFECTIVELY DEAL WITH COMPLAINTS 
How does society detect and prevent misconduct, as well as settle 
disputes in educational, governmental, and private business institutions?  
The answer to this question for most of our nation’s history was, and to 
a large degree continues to be, litigation through the courts.17  However, 
the use of the courts to quickly resolve disputes today is at best wishful 
thinking.18  Indeed, with the continued increase in case filings, it does not 
appear that litigation through the courts will be a route for quick dispute 
resolution anytime in the near future.19  Due to this lack of timely 
resolution of disputes through the courts, there has been a trend toward 
the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR).20  In fact, public policy 
and the Supreme Court favor “promoting non-judicial settlement of 
disputes.”21 
 
16. See infra Part V. 
17. See  STATISTICS  DIV.,  OFFICE  OF  JUDGES  PROGRAMS,  FEDERAL  JUDICIAL 
CASELOAD STATISTICS 40 tbl.C (2010) [hereinafter STATISTICS DIVISION], available at http:/
/www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatist
ics2010.aspx (showing that 258,535 civil actions were filed in the United States District Courts 
in the twelve-month period ending March 31, 2009, and that 282,307 civil actions were filed in 
the next twelve-month period). 
18. See id. at 59 tbl.C-5 (showing median time to trial in federal court is almost twenty-
four months). 
19. See id. at 40 tbl.C (showing an increase in case filings of 9.2% between 2009 and 
2010). 
20. Thompson, supra note 12, at 672 (noting a “trend toward ADR”). 
21. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 8 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 
7081 (providing the congressional view of public policy on the issue).  In 1973, the United 
States Supreme Court submitted a proposal to the Committee on the Judiciary that 
eventually became the current Federal Rule of Evidence 408(a)(2).  Id.  Rule 408(a)(2) 
makes certain conduct and statements made in compromise negotiations inadmissible in 
subsequent litigation.  FED. R. EVID. 408(a)(2).  One of its goals, as indicated by the 
Congress, was precisely to promote non-judicial settlements of disputes.  H.R. REP. NO. 93-
650, at 8. 
13 SPANIMAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2013  9:31 PM 
664 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [96:659 
A.  Who is an Ombudsman? 
One area of ADR that detects and prevents misconduct, as well as 
quickly settles disputes in educational, governmental, and private 
business institutions is the use of an ombudsman.22  An ombudsman is a 
neutral member of a public or private association who receives 
complaints from sources both internal and external to the association 
and helps to resolve these complaints through mediation, counseling, 
and other innumerable dispute resolution techniques.23  The use of an 
ombudsman can take various forms depending upon the organization in 
which an ombudsman is implemented; however, there are five generally 
accepted categories of ombudsmen: the classical, the executive, the 
educational, the corporate, and the newspaper.24  Notwithstanding these 
various types of ombudsmen, the term “ombudsman” will be used 
throughout this comment in the general sense to refer to a neutral 
person within any public or private organization who detects, receives, 
and resolves disputes in lieu of the disputes going to court. 
B.  Benefits of Using an Ombudsman 
It is apparent that Congress has known about the overall beneficial 
effects that the use of an ombudsman can have for some time.  In 1990, 
consistent with the “trend toward ADR,” 25  Congress passed the 
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act.26  Generally this Act requires 
that federal agencies adopt a policy that addresses the use of ADR.27  
Interestingly, the Act was soon thereafter reenacted in 1996 to include 
“use of ombuds” in the statutory definition of ADR.28  However, this 
legislation simply incorporated what had already been the practice in 
 
22. 1 JAY E. GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 2:62, at 40–41 (3d ed. 
2005). 
23. Id. 
24. Van Soye, supra note 12, at 119–25.  
25. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.  
26. Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 571–84 (2006)). 
27. Id. 
28. Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 2, 110 Stat. 
3870, 3870 (1996) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 571); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-01-446, HUMAN CAPITAL: THE ROLE OF OMBUDSMEN IN DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 7 (2001) [hereinafter HUMAN CAPITAL] (discussing federal agencies movement 
“towards greater use of ADR to deal with workplace disputes by legislation, policies of the 
adjudicatory agencies, and by the desire to avoid the time, cost, and frustration of the more 
formal dispute resolution processes”). 
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several federal agencies, including the IRS, EPA, and Commerce 
Department, that had been successfully using an ombudsman program 
since the 1980s.29  Importantly, this successful implementation of an 
ombudsman is not limited solely to the public sector.   
In addition to use in federal agencies, ombudsmen can be effective in 
large corporations to help alleviate the negative public perception of 
these corporations. 30  As the former Chairman and CEO of McDonnell 
Douglas Corporation once put it, “the average man in the streets right 
now thinks we’re all a bunch of crooks.”31  This general negative public 
perception of corporations can be traced to numerous corporate 
scandals that have been the center of media attention over the past 
fifteen years. 32   This negative public image of the corporation, in 
addition to the lack of checks and balances within many corporate 
organizations of the past, warrants the use of an ombudsman.33  Not only 
can the use of an ombudsman in a corporation improve the 
corporation’s public image, but it can also lead to an increase in the 
overall ethics of the corporation. 34   Increasing corporate ethical 
standards is important for many unquantifiable reasons, in addition to 
the fact that a majority of corporate executives “believe high ethical 
standards improve a company’s competitive position.”35 
Ombudsmen, whether used in a public or private organization, are 
unique because not only can they resolve disputes outside of court, but 
 
29. Kuta, supra note 12, at 397.  
30.  Victor Futter, An Answer to the Public Perception of Corporations: A Corporate 
Ombudsperson?, 46 BUS. LAW. 29, 55 (1990) (“If the institution of the ombudsperson could 
be made to work successfully, it will be developed in a variety of ways by the country’s 
diverse corporations and it should help to improve the public perception of corporations and 
to restore public confidence in their behavior.”).  
31. Id. at 30. 
32. See, e.g., Cathy Booth Thomas, Called to Account, TIME, June 24, 2002, at 52 
(discussing accounting firm Arthur Andersen’s role in Enron fraud, and finding that the firm, 
simply because it was associated with Enron, “had already been found guilty in the court of 
public opinion” before its trial for obstruction of justice began). 
33. Kevin  L.  Wibbenmeyer,  Privileged  Communication  Extended  to  the  Corporate 
Ombudsman-Employee Relationship Via Federal Rule of Evidence 501, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 
367, 370. 
34. Futter, supra note 30, at 55 (concluding that the ombudsman can invigorate 
corporate integrity with the public as well as ensure corporate integrity for corporations 
themselves). 
35. Id. at 49 & n.66 (citing Selwyn Feinstein, Labor Letter, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 1987, at 
1) (“[T]wo-thirds of the corporate executives questioned ‘believe high ethical standards 
improve a company’s competitive position.’”). 
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they also can prevent disputes from occurring in the first place.36  In fact, 
it has been shown that ombudsmen in corporations spend approximately 
30% of their time reporting to corporate management on “new or 
potential problems in the organization.”37  Furthermore, the use of an 
ombudsman allows organizations an opportunity to detect potential 
problems sooner, when the prospective negative impact is less severe.38  
Indeed, an ombudsman facilitates “[t]hings get[ting] surfaced that 
wouldn’t get surfaced any other way,”39 and thus helps organizations 
using an ombudsman to avoid liability in countless areas of the law, 
including business practices, Sarbanes-Oxley concerns, and equal 
opportunity claims.40 
In addition to the valuable benefit a corporation receives from the 
early detection of problems, an ombudsman also provides numerous 
other advantages.  First, as briefly mentioned earlier, an ombudsman 
allows an organization to avoid court.41  This route around litigation is a 
major reason why the use of ombudsmen has been found to be cost-
effective.42  This is due to the time and cost litigation imposes upon 
litigants.43  As compared to formal court proceedings, an ombudsman 
resolves disputes in significantly less time.44   For example, in one 
ombudsman program 40%of resolved cases were closed in two weeks, 
and the other 60% within six weeks, of when the complaint was 
received.45 
 
36. HUMAN CAPITAL, supra note 28, at 3–4.  “A key feature distinguishing ombuds from 
other dispute resolution practitioners is the ombuds’ focus on systemic issues and on 
developing conflict prevention strategies.”  Id. at 8. 
37. Thompson, supra note 12, at 666 (citing Mary P. Rowe, The Corporate Ombudsman: 
An Overview and Analysis, 3 NEGOTIATION J. 127, 132 (1987)). 
38. GRENIG, supra note 22, § 13:3, at 322. 
39. Ombuds Can Help Address Conflicts, Potential Lawsuits, HR FOCUS, Oct. 2005, at 
8–9 (quoting Wendy Fried, a corporate ombudsman). 
40. Id. at 9. 
41. See GRENIG, supra note 22, § 13:3, at 322; Thompson, supra note 12, at 653. 
42. Mary   Elizabeth   McGarry,   The   Ombudsman   Privilege:   Keeping   Harassment 
Complaints Confidential, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 30, 1995, at 1, 7 (citing Rowe, supra note 37, at 136); 
see MARY ROWE & MARY SIMON, EFFECTIVENESS OF ORGANIZATIONAL OMBUDSMEN 8 
(2001), http//web.mit.edu/ombud/publications/effectiveness_final.pdf. 
43. See STATISTICS DIVISION, supra note 17, at 59 tbl.C-5 . 
44. See, e.g., Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 133 F.R.D. 570, 572 (E.D. Mo. 1991) 
(“A successful ombudsman program resolved many problems informally and more quickly 
than other more formal procedures, including court actions.”). 
45. HUMAN  CAPITAL,  supra  note  28,  at  21–22  (reporting  on  the  success  of  the 
ombudsman program at the National Institute of Health). 
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Second, in addition to resolving disputes more quickly than 
litigation, an ombudsman conserves an organization’s resources because 
an ombudsman is much less costly than hiring outside counsel to 
investigate a dispute within the organization. 46   Moreover, if an 
ombudsman prevents one key lawsuit from being filed against a large 
corporation or stops one controversial issue about the organization from 
being disseminated in the media, the ombudsman has more than 
justified the cost to that organization.47  In addition to saving litigation 
costs, there are enormous productivity and efficiency costs a large 
organization can incur by letting problems go unnoticed.48  For instance, 
ongoing sexual harassment in the workplace can cost a large employer 
millions in absenteeism, low productivity, and employee turnover.49  
Thus, to the extent an ombudsman is resolving these issues early, the 
ombudsman is facilitating enormous future cost savings to the employer. 
A third benefit the use of an ombudsman brings to an organization is 
a result of the fact that the organization’s potential problems and 
disputes are resolved solely by the ombudsman, therefore allowing the 
managers and executives of the organization to exclusively concentrate 
on their primary goals of earning profits, organizational growth, and 
competing in the market place.50  Finally, the implementation of an 
ombudsman benefits the employees of the organization because it 
provides them a neutral person to whom they can fully voice concerns in 
confidence.51  This ability to voice concerns in confidence encourages 
 
46. Futter, supra note 30, at 48. 
47. Id. 
48. See id. at 49 (finding that in addition to saving a company potential damages in 
litigation, having an ombudsman could “avoid a tremendous amount of damaging publicity as 
well as save an inestimable amount of management time, attention, distraction, worry, and 
expense”). 
49. McGarry, supra note 42, at 1.  “Sexual harassment costs a typical Fortune 500 
company with 23,750 employees $6.7 million per year in absenteeism, low productivity and 
employee turnover.”  Ronni Sandroff, Sexual Harassment in the Fortune 500, WORKING 
WOMAN, Dec. 1988, at 69, 71. 
50. See GRENIG, supra note 22, § 13:3, at 322 (“Other areas or departments of the 
organization may acquire additional time to work on more focused departmental goals.”); 
Futter, supra note 30, at 36 (stating that an ombudsman can permit a CEO to focus attention 
on “earning profits, strategic planning, and meeting both domestic and foreign competition”); 
Wibbenmeyer, supra note 33, at 371 (noting that an ombudsman “frees top management to 
concentrate on activities necessary for the profitable growth of the corporation”). 
51. GRENIG, supra note 22, § 13:3, at 322 (noting that an ombuds program “provide[s] a 
safe mechanism for persons to raise concerns”); Futter, supra note 30, at 36 (stating that the 
creation of an ombudsman “assists employees who, for one reason or another, find it difficult 
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those employees who fear retaliation to come forward with their issues 
and leads to an overall increase in the morale of the organization.52  In 
addition, this outlet for confidential voicing of concerns will facilitate 
and encourage appropriate individual behavior throughout the 
organization.53 
C.  Statistical Use of an Ombudsman 
Considering all of the benefits that the use of an ombudsman can 
bring to an organization, it only follows that more organizations are 
starting to realize these benefits and the use of ombudsmen is on the 
rise.54  In fact, the use of ombudsmen has now gained worldwide 
recognition.55  Indeed, the United Nations employs an ombudsman 
department that handled 2,267 cases in 2011.56  In the United States, a 
survey a few years ago found that about ten percent of the responding 
corporations employed an ombudsman and that in total over 1,000 
corporations in the United States use ombudsmen. 57   The use of 
ombudsmen in United States corporations continues to grow, and 
currently ombudsmen are used in many iconic corporations including 
McDonald’s, AT&T, American Express, and Federal Express.58  In 
addition to the growing use of ombudsmen in corporations, higher 
educational institutions across North America continue to effectively 
use ombudsmen with currently over 200 colleges and universities 
employing an ombudsman department.59  Across all of these various 
organizations where ombudsmen are routinely used, it has been 
estimated that the average ombudsman may receive 200–300 complaints 
 
or impossible to go through normal reporting channels”).  
52. GRENIG, supra note 22, § 13:3, at 322 (“Increased morale and relationships should 
be more harmonious.”). 
53. Futter, supra note 30, at 36–37. 
54. Corie Marty, Recent Development, Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 13 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 275, 275 (1997). 
55. DOUGLAS   H.   YARN   &   GREGORY   TODD   JONES,   ALTERNATIVE   DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN GEORGIA § 11:31, at 373 (3d ed. 2006). 
56. Ombudsman   and   Mediation   Services:   Frequently   Asked   Questions,   UNITED 
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/ombudsman/faqs.shtml#4 (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) 
[hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions]. 
57. Van Soye, supra note 12, at 124 n.73 (citing Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Ombudsman Offices 
in the Federal Government—An Emerging Trend?, 22 ABA ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, 
Summer 1997, at 6). 
58. YARN & JONES, supra note 55, § 11:31, at 373. 
59. Id. at 374. 
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a year regarding a wide range of legal issues, including wrongful 
termination, compensation, harassment, and discrimination.60 
The use of ombudsmen in various organizations to successfully 
resolve disputes in lieu of expensive and time-consuming litigation 
continues to grow due to the numerous benefits the use of an 
ombudsman provides to an organization.61  In light of this trend, it 
follows that the law should also recognize the benefits and efficiency of 
the ombudsmen in organizations and aim to facilitate the effective use 
of ombudsmen by granting a privilege for communications with 
ombudsmen.  After all, effective use of ombudsmen does the legal 
system a favor by keeping disputes from accumulating onto the already 
congested court dockets.62 
III.  THE KEY TO THE EFFECTIVE USE OF AN OMBUDSMAN IS A 
GUARANTEE OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
In light of the growing, effective use of ombudsmen to prevent and 
resolve disputes in various types of organizations,63 the law needs to 
strive to facilitate their effective use for the benefit of society.  Like 
many other dispute resolution techniques that the law has attempted to 
facilitate the effective use of,64 successful use of the ombudsman process 
depends on the presence of certain principles, or ground rules. 65  
Multiple ombudsman associations have promulgated standards of 
practice for an ombudsman to abide by which include principles that an 
ombudsman must be independent, neutral, and keep communications 
confidential.66  For continued growth of successful ombudsman use by 
 
60. Lee P. Robbins & William B. Deane, The Corporate Ombuds: A New Approach to 
Conflict Management, NEGOTIATION J., Apr. 1986, at 195, 201. 
61. See GRENIG, supra note 22, § 13:3, at 322; Thompson, supra note 12, at 656 
(discussing rise in use of ombudsmen by corporations). 
62. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text. 
63. Thompson,  supra  note  12,  at  656  (discussing  rise  in  use  of  ombudsmen  by 
corporations); see also supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text (discussing rise in use of 
ombudsmen by the United States Government). 
64. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. §§ 408, 501; Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health 
Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1179–80 (C.D. Cal. 1998), aff'd, 216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(adopting a federal common law privilege for dispute resolution through mediation because 
confidentiality of communications during mediation is key to its success); see also discussion 
infra Part V (showing that creation of an ombudsman privilege would be similar to another 
privilege and evidentiary exclusion currently recognized by the law). 
65. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
66. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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various organizations, these standards of practice and the particular 
principles that ombudsman are ethically required to abide by must be 
respected by the courts if society is to continue to realize the benefits of 
dispute prevention and resolution through ombudsmen. 
A.  The Essential Role of Confidentiality 
Among the principles promulgated by ombudsman associations that 
practicing ombudsmen are ethically required to abide by is 
confidentiality, or protection of complainant communications with an 
ombudsman.67  This protection is essential to the ombudsman dispute 
resolution process. 68   In fact, courts have stated that “without 
confidentiality, the ombuds process would not work.” 69   If 
communications with an ombudsman in the course of attempting to 
resolve a dispute were not confidential and could be disclosed and used 
in subsequent litigation, the effective and timely dispute resolution 
afforded by an ombudsman would be destroyed.70  Additionally, a 
failure to keep communications with an ombudsman confidential would 
devastate the ombudsman process beyond repair in the eyes of third 
parties.71  The utmost importance of this confidentiality principle was 
recognized by Congress when it enacted the Administrative Dispute 
Resolution Act of 1990,72 which was intended to encourage the use of 
 
67. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
68. GRENIG, supra note 22, § 13:1, at 319 (“The most important element of an ombuds 
program is confidentiality of program usage.”); Marty, supra note 54, at 285 (“[T]he 
effectiveness of corporate ombuds programs rests on an employee’s belief that information 
divulged will remain confidential, and destroyed the employee’s confidence in that 
confidentiality will destroy the corporate ombudsman program itself.”); Thompson, supra 
note 12, at 654 (“[T]he ombudsman relies on the confidential nature of his office to encourage 
employees to come forward . . . .”); Katherine A. Welch, Note, No Notice Is Good News: 
Notice Under the New Ombuds Standards for the Establishment and Operation of Ombuds 
Offices, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 193, 198 (“Key to the ombuds process is the protection afforded 
to communications that are made to an ombuds by a complainant.”). 
69. Welch, supra note 68, at 198–99 (discussing Garstang v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 84 (Ct. App. 1995); and Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 133 F.R.D. 570 (E.D. Mo. 
1991) (supporting the proposition that confidentiality is vital to the ombuds process)); see also 
infra notes 117–21 and accompanying text.  
70. Wibbenmeyer, supra note 33, at 377 (“The quick and effective settlement processes 
offered by the ombudsman concept would be stifled if the statements made by the 
ombudsman or employee could be used in eventual legal proceedings.”). 
71. GRENIG, supra note 22, § 13:3, at 323 (“If the necessity of confidentiality is breached, 
then the program will be irreparably destroyed in the eyes of other persons.”). 
72. Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 
(codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 571–84 (2006)). 
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ADR in federal agencies and specifically states that communications 
made to a neutral party in dispute resolution settings cannot be 
disclosed and must remain confidential, subject to listed exceptions.73 
In addition to Congress recognizing the significance of 
confidentiality, multiple ombudsman associations along with the 
American Bar Association (ABA) have endorsed the view that when an 
ombudsman has offered confidentiality to a complainant, the 
ombudsman must maintain that confidence. 74   The International 
Ombudsman Association’s Standards of Practice, which practicing 
member ombudsmen are required to adhere by, states that ombudsmen 
must maintain all communications in strict confidence, such 
communications are privileged, and that any task the ombudsman 
performs during the scope of his work, including data and record 
keeping, must maintain this confidentiality as a top priority.75  Another 
ombudsman association, the United States Ombudsman Association, 
has also promulgated standards requiring confidentiality and similarly 
stating that the ombudsman take strong efforts to keep all records 
confidential, while adding that the ombudsman cannot be compelled to 
testify in a formal proceeding.76  In addition to these ombudsman 
associations, the ABA has also publicized the importance of 
confidentiality in a memorandum supporting a privilege for 
communications with an ombudsman and discussing the value to society 
of the ombudsman as well as the indispensability of confidence to the 
effectiveness of the process.77  Clearly, confidentiality of ombudsman 
communications has the support of these associations. 
As well as ombudsman associations, scholars, courts, and Congress 
 
73. 5 U.S.C. § 574 (2006); Ellen E. Deason, Predictable Mediation Confidentiality in the 
U.S. Federal System, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 239, 264 (2002) (“The Act prohibits 
ADR neutrals and parties from voluntarily disclosing communications or from being required 
to disclose communications through discovery or compulsory processes.”). 
74 . See IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 7, § 3.1; GOVERNMENTAL 
OMBUDSMAN STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 2, §§ I(C), II(A)(8)(d), II(C)(1)–(2); AMERICAN 
BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND OPERATION OF OMBUDS 
OFFICES 5 (2004) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS], available at http://www.abanet.org/leaders
hip/2004/recommendations/115.pdf (“An ombuds does not disclose and is not required to 
disclose any information provided in confidence, except to address an imminent risk of 
serious harm.”). 
75. IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 7, § 3.1–.8. 
76. GOVERNMENTAL OMBUDSMAN STANDARDS, supra note 7, §§ I(C), II(A)(8)(d), 
II(C)(1)–(3). 
77. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 74; Kuta, supra note 12, at 409–10 (discussing a 
memorandum produced by the ABA in support of an ombudsman privilege). 
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all recognizing the importance of confidentiality, those who directly deal 
with and use an ombudsman also recognize the necessity that these 
communications be kept confidential.78  This belief in the significance of 
confidentiality of communications is illustrated by the first question 
almost all people who come to an ombudsman ask, “Is this discussion 
off the record?”79  Anyone who comes to an ombudsman to voice his or 
her concerns finds security and confidence in the fact that reporting an 
issue to an ombudsman will be “off the record” and not later disclosed 
or used adversely because these patrons know the ombudsman has a 
duty under his or her standards of practice to keep the conversation 
confidential.80  The ability to have off the record, or confidential, 
communications not only provides a sense of security by knowing the 
conversation cannot be disclosed later or subsequently used adversely in 
formal proceedings, but also provides a safe route to raise concerns 
without the worry of retaliation in the present.81  This feeling of security 
that a guarantee of confidentiality provides, explains why outlets for 
raising issues that guarantee confidentiality receive usage rates twice 
that of outlets that do not guarantee confidentiality of such 
communications.82 
B.  The Argument Against Confidentiality 
While the focal point of this piece centers on the need for 
confidentiality from the perspective of the complainant who discloses 
information through the ombudsman process, recognizing a privilege for 
communications with an ombudsman also necessitates that statements 
made to the ombudsman by the institution or organization with whom 
the complainant has an issue also remain confidential.  Although the 
essential role confidentiality plays from the complainant’s perspective is 
well-documented,83 not everyone agrees that confidentiality is always 
 
78. McGarry, supra note 42, at 1, 7 (recognizing the need for “strictly confidential 
complaint channels” and noting that “[i]t is critical for an ombudsman office to . . . establish 
procedures to ensure that confidentiality is, in fact, provided.”). 
79. Id. at 7. 
80. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
81. GRENIG, supra note 22, § 13:3, at 322 (“Anonymity, confidentiality and non-
retaliation provide a safe mechanism for persons to raise concerns.”). 
82. McGarry, supra note 42, at 7. 
83. See, e.g., Deason, supra note 73, at 243 (noting that confidentiality “is regarded as so 
crucial for mediation that the importance of confidentiality itself is rarely at issue in 
mediation scholarship”); see also supra Part III.A (discussing the essential role of 
confidentiality in the ombudsman process). 
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100% beneficial, especially when invoked to keep actions of the 
institution or organization from the public eye.84 
Rather, some argue that confidentiality impedes the public’s right to 
know.85  Furthermore, in contrasting the transparency of courts with the 
opaqueness of ADR proceedings due to confidentiality, a court stated: 
“[P]ublic access to court proceedings helps society become aware of 
unfair business acts and practices, educating consumers and thereby 
discouraging such activities[,]” while confidential ADR proceedings, 
such as arbitration, “prevent the public from discovering such violative 
acts and practices.”86  For instance, confidentiality can endanger the 
public health by keeping critical information from those who need it 
most.87  Additionally, as a result of keeping information out of the 
public’s eye the problem of over-avoidance due to under-informed 
consumers leads to shifting to inferior alternatives in both the labor and 
goods markets.88  Finally, in the context of ADR, which usually involves 
a third party neutral, confidentiality shields this third party neutral from 
public oversight and scrutiny, and thus, there is no analog to the public 
accountability judges have.89 
In the end, despite these criticisms of confidentiality, the benefits 
 
84. Laurie Kratky Doré, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It’s Time to Let Some Sun 
Shine in On Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 466, 518–19 (2006) 
(stating, among other things, that due to the secret, confidential environment ADR operates 
in, a “world of mischief” can be concealed behind ADR’s closed doors). 
85. Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrimination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927, 
947 (2006) (“[T]he backbone of the argument against confidentiality [is] the right of the 
public to know.”). 
86. Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1181 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004). 
87. See, e.g., Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 262 (Cal. 2004) (holding that 
confidentiality afforded to information obtained through prior mediation prevented current 
discovery of materials related to the mold-infested condition to which tenants were exposed); 
Gina Kolata, Secrecy Orders in Lawsuits Prompt States’ Efforts to Restrict Their Use, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 18, 1992, at D10 (discussing controversy regarding silicone breast implants where 
data related to dangers associated with the implants had been kept in confidence from the 
public for years). 
88. Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential 
Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 907–09 (2007) (discussing the impact that news of public 
settlements would have in assisting consumers and workers in distinguishing dangerous 
products from good ones and dangerous jobs from safer ones); see also Kotkin, supra note 85, 
at 929 (arguing that the ability to keep settlements confidential leads to invisible workplace 
discrimination). 
89. Doré, supra note 84, at 490 (noting that a third party neutral, such as an arbitrator, 
“who already possesses largely unchecked discretion,” is free from public scrutiny due to the 
confidentiality of the proceeding). 
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confidentiality affords to the ombudsman process far outweigh any 
perceived adverse consequences.  Indeed, confidentiality is essential to 
facilitate the quality of communication needed to effectively resolve 
disputes with an organization.90 
IV. THE ESSENTIAL ROLE OF CONFIDENTIALITY: COURTS DO NOT 
ALWAYS AGREE 
A.  Determination of Privilege Left to the Common Law 
Despite the essential role confidentiality plays in the ombudsman 
process, courts over the years have taken diverging views on granting a 
privilege for communications with an ombudsman.91  Federal courts 
have been given the ability to determine what constitutes privileged 
communications as a matter of common law by the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.92   Specifically, the federal courts are to determine what 
constitutes privileged information “in the light of reason and 
experience.”93  This decision in the Federal Rules of Evidence by the 
Senate and the House to allow the federal courts to determine whether 
a privilege exists on a case-by-case basis, rather than explicitly granting 
an arbitrary number of privileges in specific relationships,94 shows the 
desire of the House and Senate to encourage federal courts to continue 
to develop privileges as necessary in specific beneficial circumstances.95  
 
90. See Deason, supra note 73, at 245–47 (discussing the benefits confidentiality affords 
in mediation proceedings). 
91. See, e.g., Kientzy v. McDonnell Corp., 133 F.R.D. 570, 573 (E.D. Mo. 1991) 
(recognizing privilege for communications with ombudsman in that instance because of the 
importance of confidentiality to the process); Shabazz v. Scurr, 662 F. Supp. 90, 90–91, 94 
(S.D. Iowa 1987) (granting a privilege for ombudsman communications and stating that there 
are other means for obtaining the evidence).  But see Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 
114 F.3d 790, 794–95 (8th Cir. 1997) (declining to recognize a privilege for communications 
with an ombudsman without establishment of more facts regarding the benefit of the 
ombudsman program). 
92. FED. R. EVID. 501 (“The common law—as interpreted by United States courts in the 
light of reason and experience—governs a claim of privilege.”). 
93. Id. 
94. See Kuta, supra note 12, at 399–400 (noting as originally proposed by the committee 
charged with writing the Federal Rules of Evidence, there was to be nine specific privileges 
the federal courts were required to recognize which were as follows: lawyer-client, 
psychotherapist-patient, husband-wife, communications to clergymen, political vote, trade 
secrets, secrets of state and other official information, and the identity of informers). 
95. Id.; Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1996) (“[Federal Rule of Evidence 501] did 
not freeze the law governing the privileges of witnesses in federal trials at a particular point in 
our history, but rather directed federal courts to ‘continue the evolutionary development of 
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Putting this authority into practice, federal courts have recognized 
communications as privileged when the interests the privilege promotes 
sufficiently outweigh the normally predominate principle of using all 
available means of obtaining evidence to determine the truth.96 
The debate as to whether a privilege should apply generally contains 
the same arguments on both sides notwithstanding the particular subject 
matter sought to be protected through a privilege.  Those against 
granting a privilege in a specific circumstance cite the old adage that 
“the public has a claim to every man’s evidence.”97  Furthermore, those 
opposing the creation of a wholly new privilege argue that it is a big step 
and creating such a barrier to obtaining relevant evidence in the truth 
seeking process must not be undertaken lightly.98  On the other hand, 
those proponents of a privilege contend that without the privilege most 
of the desirable evidence that a party seeks, such as admissions against 
interest, exists because of the privilege and is not likely to have come 
into being in the first place if there were no such privilege. 99  
Additionally, these proponents point out that when a privilege is 
granted it is limited in the sense that it only bars disclosure of the 
communication itself, and it does not prevent a party seeking certain 
evidence from obtaining and using the underlying facts of that 
communication through other means.100  Such arguments are taken into 
account by a court when determining whether a privilege will apply in 
 
testimonial privileges.’”  (citation omitted)). 
96. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9; Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53 (1980) (defining 
adverse spousal testimony privilege to apply only to the witness-spouse, and finding that such 
a privilege furthered the important public interest in marital communications without overly 
burdening evidentiary needs); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (“every . . . 
exemption is grounded in a substantial individual interest which has been found, through 
centuries of experience, to outweigh the public interest in the search for truth.”). 
97. 12 COBBETT’S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 25 (London, T.C. Hansard 
1812) [hereinafter COBBETT’S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY]. 
98. Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 1997) (“To justify 
the creation of a privilege, [the defendant] must first establish that society benefits in some 
significant way from the particular brand of confidentiality that the privilege affords.”). 
99. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12 (“Without a privilege, much of the desirable evidence to which 
litigants such as petitioner seek access—for example, admissions against interest by a party—
is unlikely to come into being [and] [t]his unspoken ‘evidence’ will therefore serve no greater 
truth-seeking function than if it had been spoken and privileged.”). 
100. Shabazz v. Scurr, 662 F. Supp. 90, 93 (S.D. Iowa 1987) (“The privileged nature of 
communications [the ombudsman] received as the ombudsman does not prevent the plaintiffs 
from using other means to prove the existence of facts communicated to him.”). 
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the particular case.101 
The federal courts’ process for determining whether a privilege 
exists on a case-by-case basis “in the light of reason and experience”102 is 
substantially the same as the state courts’ process where determinations 
of privileges are also left to the common law.103  The only difference, 
however, is that many states have explicitly adopted statutory provisions 
addressing privileges in certain specific circumstances.104  Therefore, 
when such specific circumstances are at issue and the statutory provision 
is called into operation, there is no need to leave the determination of a 
privilege up to the court; the issue has already been determined as a 
matter of policy by the state’s legislature. 
 
101. See id. at 92–93. 
102. FED. R. EVID. 501; see, e.g., Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 8–9; United States v. Rakes, 136 F.3d 
1, 3–4 (1st Cir. 1998) (discussing some of the factors taken into consideration when the court 
determined the applicability of the spousal privilege: that the husband intended his 
conversations with this wife to be confidential; that there is no exception to spousal privilege 
in communications related to financial matters; that it did not matter whether the husband 
relayed to his wife the events already occurred in these conversations; and that it did not 
matter that the spousal communications took place at the same time as criminal act conduct 
with which the husband was charged in the present case). 
103. Van Soye, supra note 12, at 130 (“Rule 501 allows federal courts to recognize new 
privileges based on common law principles, applying the court’s ‘reason and experience,’ on a 
case-by-case basis.”)  
104. See Deason, supra note 73, at 259 (“Many of the states with general mediation 
statutes or evidentiary rules chose privilege as the most effective framework for protecting 
confidentiality in legal proceedings . . . .”); see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 24.55.160(b) (2010) 
(“The ombudsman shall maintain confidentiality with respect to all matters and the identities 
of the complainants or witnesses coming before the ombudsman except insofar as disclosures 
may be necessary to enable the ombudsman to carry out duties and to support 
recommendations.”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 96-9(b) (LexisNexis 2012) (“The ombudsman 
is required to maintain secrecy in respect to all matters and the identities of the complainants 
or witnesses coming before the ombudsman except so far as disclosures may be necessary to 
enable the ombudsman to carry out the ombudsman’s duties and to support the ombudsman’s 
recommendations.”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 2C.20 (West 2008) (“[N]or shall the citizens’ aide 
or any member of the staff be compelled to testify in any court with respect to any matter 
involving the exercise of the citizens’ aide’s official duties . . . .”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-8,253 
(2008) (“Neither the Public Counsel nor any member of his staff shall be required to testify or 
produce evidence in any judicial or administrative proceeding concerning matters within his 
official cognizance . . . .”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.06A.060 (West 2009) (“Neither the 
ombudsman nor the ombudsman’s staff may be compelled, in any judicial or administrative 
proceeding, to testify or to produce evidence regarding the exercise of the official duties of 
the ombudsman or of the ombudsman’s staff.”). 
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B.  Early Common Law on Privilege for Communications with an 
Ombudsman 
As a result of leaving the determination of whether privileges should 
exist up to the common law, much inconsistency regarding the 
recognition of a privilege for communications with an ombudsman has 
resulted among courts over time.105  Early on, courts began to recognize 
a privilege for communications with an ombudsman in specific contexts 
on a case-by-case basis.106 
The first case to apply Federal Rule of Evidence 501 in the context 
of communications with an ombudsman, Shabazz v. Scurr,107 ruled that 
such communications were privileged. 108   Shabazz held that 
communications made specifically to a prison ombudsman were 
privileged, reasoning that this confidentiality encouraged such 
complaints to be brought freely.109  The next case brought to court 
concerning the recognition of a privilege for communications with an 
ombudsman occurred in Monoranjan Roy v. United Technologies 
Corp.110  In fact, Roy was the first court to recognize a privilege for 
communications with an ombudsman in a corporate setting by holding 
that in this specific case there was a privilege from discovery for the 
defendant company’s ombudsman because the communications in the 
context presented there, between the corporate ombudsman and an 
employee of the corporation, were privileged.111 
Shortly after Roy, the court in Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas 
Corp.112 continued the trend of recognizing an ombudsman privilege 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 501.113  In Kientzy, the plaintiff, a 
former employee of the defendant corporation, brought suit claiming 
wrongful termination and as part of discovery sought to take a 
 
105. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
106. See Wibbenmeyer, supra note 33, at 373. 
107. Shabazz v. Scurr, 662 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Iowa 1987). 
108. Id. at 90–91. 
109. Id. at 92 (“[A]nything which chills a citizen’s willingness to come forward limits the 
[ombudsman] office’s effectiveness in the long run . . . .”). 
110. Roy v. United Techs. Corp., No. H–89–680, at 23–24 (D. Conn. May 29, 1990). 
111. Id.; Wibbenmeyer, supra note 33, at 373. 
112. Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 133 F.R.D. 570 (E.D. Mo. 1991). 
113. Id. at 571; see also Van Soye, supra note 12, at 130 (discussing Kientzy); 
Wibbenmeyer, supra note 33, at 373 (noting that Monoranjan Roy expanded the Kientzy 
decision and found a privilege applicable to the communications of a corporate ombudsman 
and an employee). 
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deposition of the defendant’s ombudsman concerning communications 
made to the ombudsman by defendant’s management involved in the 
decision to terminate the plaintiff.114  However, the court held that such 
communications made to the ombudsman in the circumstances 
presented to the court, were privileged, and, therefore, the plaintiff 
could not compel the ombudsman nor the management to disclose the 
statements made between each other regarding the plaintiff’s 
termination. 115   The court found the communications with the 
ombudsman to be confidential because the following four facts were 
present in this case: 1) the statements were made with the belief that 
they would be kept confidential; 2) the need for confidential 
communication is essential to the effective functioning of the 
ombudsman; 3) the relationship between the ombudsman and the 
defendant’s employees and management is worthy of societal 
protection; and 4) the benefit to plaintiff gained by disclosure is 
outweighed by the harm that would be caused by an interference in the 
confidential relationship between the ombudsman and others.116 
C.  Reversal of the Early Common Law on Privilege for Communications 
with an Ombudsman 
Despite the early trend of courts to recognize a privilege for 
communications with an ombudsman under Federal Rule of Evidence 
501, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit later rendered a 
decision that marked a polar shift in the court’s view of an ombudsman 
privilege.117 
The Eighth Circuit held in Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.118 
that an employee’s confidential communications made to the 
corporation’s ombudsman were not privileged.119  This holding was a 
complete departure from the previous decisions of Shabazz,120 Roy,121 
 
114. Kientzy, 133 F.R.D. at 571. 
115. Id. at 573 (noting, as with all privileges, that plaintiffs cannot compel anyone to 
disclose their specific statements to the corporation’s ombudsman but could compel 
disclosure of any facts known to them, even though these facts may have been contained in 
statements to the ombudsman). 
116. Id. at 571–72. 
117. Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790, 794–95 (8th Cir. 1997) 
(rejecting Kientzy holding and denying a privilege for communications with an ombudsman in 
the same program at issue in Kientzy). 
118. Id. at 790. 
119. Id. at 794–95. 
120. See Shabazz v. Scurr, 662 F. Supp. 90, 90–91 (S.D. Iowa 1987) (recognizing a 
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and Kientzy. 122   The Carman court reasoned that in the specific 
circumstances McDonnell Douglas had not provided any evidence that 
its ombudsman process was successful at resolving disputes involving the 
corporation prior to litigation.  The court also noted that McDonnell 
Douglas failed to show that the advantages of the ombudsman program 
would be lost without a privilege because the ombudsman could still 
promise to keep the employee’s communications confidential from 
corporate management. 123   Furthermore, the court stated that for 
McDonnell Douglas to justify the creation of an ombudsman privilege, 
it needed to first demonstrate that “society benefits in some significant 
way from the particular brand of confidentiality that the privilege 
affords.”124 
Not only did the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Carman mark a change 
in the court’s view towards an ombudsman privilege,125 it presents a 
troubling dilemma for all practicing ombudsmen.  As discussed earlier,126 
ombudsmen are required to adhere to standards of practice 
promulgated by the ombudsman association to which they are 
members.127  These standards of practice include the duty that all 
communications made to the ombudsman are privileged and must be 
maintained in confidence by the ombudsman as a top priority.128  These 
mandates of the standards of practice for ombudsmen stand in direct 
conflict with the Carman court’s holding that the communications made 
to the ombudsman in that case were not privileged and the ombudsman 
could be compelled to disclose the communications in litigation.129  This 
now leaves practicing ombudsmen to choose between violating the 
 
privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 for communications with a prison ombudsman 
because it encourages complainants to come forward). 
121. See Roy v. United Techs. Corp., No. H–89–680 23–24 (D.Conn. May 29, 1990) 
(recognizing a privilege for communications with a corporate ombudsman under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 501). 
122. See Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 133 F.R.D. 570, 573 (E.D. Mo. 1991) 
(holding that corporation’s ombudsman could not be compelled to disclose communications 
made to her by corporation’s management regarding the termination of the plaintiff). 
123. Carman, 114 F.3d at 793–94. 
124. Id. at 794. 
125. Id. at 794–95. 
126. See supra Part III. 
127. See  generally  IOA  STANDARDS  OF  PRACTICE,  supra  note  7;  GOVERNMENTAL 
OMBUDSMAN STANDARDS, supra note 7. 
128. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
129. Carman, 114 F.3d at 794–95. 
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ombudsman standards of practice they have vowed to abide by or 
disregarding a court order to disclose communications that were thought 
to be made in confidence.130 
D.  Persuading a Court to Grant an Ombudsman Privilege Today 
The few subsequent cases since Carman dealing with the issue of an 
ombudsman privilege have done little to help clear up the troubling 
conflict131 ombudsmen are now confronted with between their standards 
of practice and courts denying a privilege for communications with an 
ombudsman.132  However, despite the decision in Carman,133 because 
privileges are granted on a case-by-case basis134 it is still entirely possible 
that a court would grant an ombudsman privilege when a strong enough 
factual showing has been made as to the importance and effectiveness of 
the ombudsman in the specific case.135  Such a showing was not made in 
Carman.136  In fact, by the time the suit was brought, the ombudsman 
office at issue had been abolished and no facts whatsoever were 
provided to the court regarding the ombudsman office in general, much 
less how the office operated or why the privilege was important.137  As a 
result, because no facts were presented to the court to justify 
entitlement to an ombudsman privilege, the court had no choice but to 
deny such a privilege in the specific case.138  Therefore, as the law 
concerning an ombudsman privilege currently stands, the best way for a 
practicing ombudsman to avoid conflict between his or her standards of 
 
130. Compare IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 7, § 3.1 (“The Ombudsman 
holds all communications with those seeking assistance in strict confidence . . . .”), and 
GOVERNMENTAL OMBUDSMAN STANDARDS, supra note 7, § II(C)(1) (“The Ombudsman 
should not reveal information when confidentiality has been promised.”), with Carman, 114 
F.3d at 794–95 (ordering an ombudsman to produce evidence of employee communications 
thought to have been made in confidence). 
131. See, e.g., Miller v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., No. 98-1012, 1999 WL 506520, at 
*15 (10th Cir. July 19, 1999) (denying privilege for communications with an ombudsman). 
132. See supra Part IV.C. 
133. Carman, 114 F.3d at 794. 
134. See supra notes 91–95 and accompanying text. 
135. See Carman, 114 F.3d at 793–94; Van Soye, supra note 12, at 132; Charles L. 
Howard & George R. Wratney, In Aftermath of the Carman Decision, Ombuds “Privilege” 
Still Has Validity, ETHIKOS, May/June 1999, at 9–10. 
136. Carman, 114 F.3d at 793 (stating that no evidence was presented, and was not even 
argued, showing the success of the ombudsman office or advantages provided by having the 
office). 
137. Id.; Marty, supra note 54, at 281; Howard & Wratney, supra note 135, at 9–10. 
138. See Carman, 114 F.3d at 793; Howard & Wratney, supra note 135, at 10. 
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practice mandating communications be kept confidential139 and a court 
potentially denying a privilege and compelling disclosure of the 
confidential communications140 is to prove entitlement to an ombudsman 
privilege in every case brought before a court.141 
Proving entitlement to an ombudsman privilege can be done by 
demonstrating to the court why confidentiality is vital to the effective 
use of the ombudsman process142 and that the relationship between an 
ombudsman and a complainant benefits society. 143   Additionally, 
showing how the process works within the organization, presenting the 
ombudsman standards of practice promulgated by various respected 
organizations and followed by ombudsmen, and producing detailed 
statistics regarding the use of the ombudsman’s office within the 
organization can all successfully persuade a court to understand why an 
ombudsman privilege is necessary and must be granted in the particular 
case before it.144 
E.  Other Ways to Attempt to Keep Communications with an 
Ombudsman Confidential Without Having to Persuade a Court to Grant 
a Privilege 
Persuading a court to grant a privilege for communications with an 
ombudsman each time the issue is brought before the court145 can be 
unpredictable and require significant resources.146  Therefore, alternate 
ways of keeping communications with an ombudsman confidential 
without the need for a court’s agreement that such communications 
should be protected are desirable. 
Perhaps the easiest way for an ombudsman to attempt to keep 
communications confidential, and thus remain in compliance with the 
ombudsman’s standards of practice,147 without the need to persuade a 
 
139. See IOA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 7, § 3.1. 
140. See, e.g., Carman, 114 F.3d at 794–95. 
141. Howard & Wratney, supra note 135, at 10. 
142. Marty, supra note 54, at 286; Howard & Wratney, supra note 135, at 10, 13; see 
supra Part III. 
143. Marty, supra note 54, at 286 (explaining that “[a]ny corporation that hopes to 
invoke the ombudsman privilege will have to convince the court . . . that this relationship is 
one that benefits society as a whole”). 
144. Howard & Wratney, supra note 135, at 10, 13, 16. 
145. See supra Part IV.D (detailing how to persuade a court in a particular case why a 
privilege for communications with an ombudsman should be granted). 
146. See Howard & Wratney, supra note 135, at 10, 13, 16. 
147. See  supra  Part  III  (noting  that  ombudsmen  standards  of  practice  require  an 
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court to grant a privilege is to have each complainant who comes to the 
ombudsman sign a confidentiality agreement. 148   The use of 
confidentiality agreements not only reinforces to complainants that their 
communications will not be disclosed, but it also serves as evidence that 
complainants had a belief that their communications with an 
ombudsman would be kept confidential. 149   Such evidence of an 
individual’s belief about the ombudsman program is important because 
the further it can be demonstrated that potential complainants were 
promised confidentiality in their communications with an ombudsman, 
the greater the likelihood a court will refuse to allow these 
communications to be disclosed at trial.150   Therefore, a practicing 
ombudsman should routinely have all complainants sign confidentiality 
agreements in order to decrease the likelihood a court would require the 
communications be disclosed in future litigation.151 
Another technique, which is similar to executing confidentiality 
agreements, used by organizations to attempt to protect 
communications with an ombudsman from compulsory disclosure in 
litigation is to include in the bylaws of the specific organization that all 
communications with the organization’s ombudsman are confidential.152  
For example, the United Nations Office of the Ombudsman has 
included in its bylaws that all communications with the Office of the 
Ombudsman are to be confidential and remain so unless one of three 
conditions is met: waiver by the complainant; explicit permission by a 
U.N. staff member; or imminent risk of serious harm without a 
reasonable alternative.153  It stands to reason that if a court is willing to 
keep communications confidential because potential complainants were 
 
ombudsman to keep all communications confidential). 
148. See Van Soye, supra note 12, at 141–42; Deason, supra note 73, at 251. 
149. See Garstang v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 84, 88–90 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).  
Evidence that complainants were led to believe their communications with an ombudsman 
would be kept in confidence has been used to keep communications with an ombudsman 
from being used as evidence at trial.  See id. (emphasizing the complainants’ belief that their 
communications would be kept confidential in refusing to allow the communications to the 
ombudsman to be disclosed for evidentiary use at trial). 
150. Id. (holding that the privacy of the parties due to the private nature of the 
communications and the existence of a pledge of confidentiality required that the discovery of 
such communications with the corporate ombudsman be denied). 
151. Van Soye, supra note 12, at 145–46. 
152. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 56, at 3 (noting that the United 
Nation’s bylaws state that communications by the Office of United Nations Ombudsman and 
Mediation Services are required to be kept confidential). 
153. Id. 
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led to believe their communications would be kept in confidence,154 a 
court should keep communications with an ombudsman confidential 
where the ombudsman is part of an organization whose bylaws require 
and make it known that the communications are to be confidential—
essentially an implicit confidentiality agreement. 
Finally, depending on the jurisdiction, there may be no need to 
persuade a court that communications with an ombudsman should be 
privileged in the specific case because of the particular jurisdiction’s 
statutes. 155   Some states have recognized the important role 
confidentiality plays in the ombudsman process and have created 
statutes providing that communications with an ombudsman are to be 
privileged.156  However, only a small minority of jurisdictions have 
statutes addressing whether communications with an ombudsman are 
privileged, and of those that do the statutes vary extensively. 157  
Consequently, the best practice for an ombudsman is still to have all 
complainants sign confidentiality agreements 158  regardless of the 
jurisdiction because even where a state statute declares communications 
with an ombudsman to be privileged, the issue of the confidentiality of 
the communications could still later be addressed in another case under 
a different jurisdiction’s law. 
V.  CREATION OF AN OMBUDSMAN PRIVILEGE WOULD BE SIMILAR TO 
ANOTHER PRIVILEGE AND EVIDENTIARY EXCLUSION CURRENTLY 
RECOGNIZED BY THE LAW 
Despite the old saying that “the public has a claim to every man’s 
evidence”159 and the common understanding that the creation of a 
wholly new privilege is a big step that should not be undertaken 
lightly, 160  recognizing a privilege for communications with an 
ombudsman would be very analogous to another privilege as well as to 
an evidentiary exclusion acknowledged under the law today.161  Indeed, 
 
154. See Garstang, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87. 
155. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
156. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
157. See Kuta, supra note 12, at 395–97 (discussing the varying state statutes in the area 
of ombudsman communications). 
158. Van Soye, supra note 12, at 141–42 (noting that confidentiality agreements are 
arguably “the key to maintaining the secrecy of proceedings”). 
159. See COBBETT’S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 97. 
160. See, e.g., Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 1997). 
161. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4) (2006).  These procedures 
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the particular privilege and the evidentiary exclusion recognized today 
are strikingly similar in their principles (in the case of the current 
privilege, it even encompasses a major function an ombudsman 
performs 162 ) to those a privilege for communications with an 
ombudsman would serve. 163   Therefore, because an ombudsman 
privilege would be exceptionally similar to another currently recognized 
privilege and evidentiary exclusion, creating an ombudsman privilege is 
not “a wholly new . . . privilege” or even a “big step.”164 
A.  Similarity to the Mediation Privilege 
The ombudsman process is exceedingly similar to, and rather 
frequently includes,165 mediation.  Mediation is a process whereby a 
neutral assists the parties to a dispute in reaching a settlement.166  
Mediation does not need to be formally labeled as such,167 and in fact 
there are no special requirements (except that usually the parties desire 
someone who is neutral to the dispute) that need to be met for one to 
qualify as a mediator.168  Communications made during mediation are 
protected as privileged under federal law169 and a majority of states’ 
laws, although the extent and scope of the protection varies.170 
In performing his or her role, the ombudsman seeks to settle 
complaints brought concerning the organization the ombudsman is a 
 
provide confidentiality for employees’ submissions concerning “questionable accounting” 
practices within their company.  Id.  In fact, many companies have elected to create an 
ombudsman office to receive these confidential complaints.  Welch, supra note 68, at 206–07. 
162. See infra Part V.A. 
163. See infra Part V.A–B. 
164. Carman, 114 F.3d at 794. 
165. GOVERNMENTAL OMBUDSMAN STANDARDS, supra note 7, § II(D)(2)(b) (noting 
that mediation of disputes is part of an ombudsman’s role). 
166. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1115(a) (West 2009) (defining mediation as “a process 
in which a neutral person . . . facilitate[s] communication between the disputants to assist 
them in reaching a mutually acceptable agreement”); GRENIG, supra note 22, § 4:3, at 63 
(noting that a neutral assists parties in settling disputes). 
167. Van Soye, supra note 12, at 142. 
168. See GRENIG, supra note 22, § 4:40–:41, at 80–82 (discussing both the characteristics 
as well as roles and functions of a competent and effective mediator). 
169. E.g., In re RDM Sports Grp, Inc., 277 B.R. 415, 438 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002); Folb v. 
Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1171 (C.D. Cal. 1998), 
aff'd, 216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000). 
170. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12–2238 (2011); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119 (West 
2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13–22–307 (West 2011); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 20/6 (West 
2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 679.12 (West 1998); WIS. STAT. § 904.085 (2009–2010); see also 
Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1178–80 (discussing mediation privilege status in some of the states). 
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part of through direct resolution, investigation, advocacy, or 
mediation.171  As a result of mediation being broadly defined as a neutral 
assisting two parties in resolving their dispute and there being no 
requirement that a formal title be given to the interactions, a significant 
portion of what an ombudsman does on a daily basis when handling 
complaints is mediation.172  When an employee of the organization 
brings a complaint to the ombudsman, the ombudsman acts as the 
mediator between the complainant employee and the organization to 
assist these two parties in resolving the dispute.173  Therefore, it stands to 
reason that those communications made to the ombudsman in the 
context of settling a dispute should almost certainly meet the definition 
of mediation and be protected under the mediation privilege.174 
There are two major differences between a traditional mediator and 
an ombudsman mediating a dispute between his or her organization and 
a complainant that can make mediation through an ombudsman more 
effective.  One main difference between a traditional mediator and an 
ombudsman is that when an ombudsman is doing the mediating the 
ombudsman has additional capabilities, which a traditional mediator 
would not have, to generate detailed information and investigate aspects 
of the dispute from within the organization.175   This ability of an 
ombudsman can lead to a resolution of the dispute that is more 
specifically fitted to, and therefore more satisfactory to, the parties at 
hand.176  The other main difference between a traditional mediator and 
an ombudsman again results from the ombudsman’s position within the 
organization and the power given to many ombudsmen to help initiate 
changes within the organization.177  Whereas a traditional mediator only 
 
171. GRENIG, supra note 22, § 13:26, at 334 (“The common duties of ombuds include: 
listening to and taking in contacts from targeted stakeholders, investigating the concerns or 
questions, making recommendations to the organization, and reporting on ombuds’ 
activities.”); YARN & JONES, supra note 56, § 11:31, at 372–73; Thompson, supra note 12, at 
672. 
172. Van Soye, supra note 12, at 142 (stating that because “[m]ediation need not be 
formally designated as such,” the ombudsman can be considered a mediator). 
173. See Kuta, supra note 12, at 391. 
174. See Van Soye, supra note 12, at 142–43 (stating that because “[m]ediation need not 
be formally designated as such,” the ombudsman can be considered a mediator and “[t]he 
mediation privilege [can] belong[] to the neutral ombudsman”). 
175. See  Kuta,  supra  note  12,  at  390–92  (discussing  an  ombudsman’s  extensive 
investigation powers). 
176. See id. at 390–91. 
177. See GRENIG, supra note 22, § 13:1, at 318 (mentioning ombudsmen have superior 
access to upper management). 
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has the power to recommend rather general settlements to the dispute,178 
an ombudsman in many organizations has the power to not only 
recommend a wider range of remedies for settlement, such as internal 
procedural changes in the organization, but also to try and ensure that 
the final resolution to the dispute is followed through.179 
Consequently, because the mediation privilege that is recognized 
today encompasses a chief portion of what an ombudsman does on a 
daily basis, 180  creating a privilege for communications with an 
ombudsman is the logical next step.  After all, in many ways an 
ombudsman can resolve disputes through mediation more effectively 
than even the most well-respected mediators could in the circumstances 
because the ombudsman has the ability to use his or her position inside 
the organization to ensure a more tailored and pleasing resolution for 
the disputing parties.181  
B. Similarity to Exclusion of Settlement Negotiations 
The creation of a privilege for communications with an ombudsman 
would not constitute a big step because the privilege would be based 
on—and further—the same policy that is currently embodied by an 
evidence rule excluding conduct or statements made in compromise 
negotiations.182  Specifically, Federal Rule of Evidence 408 states that 
any evidence of “conduct or statement[s] made in compromise 
negotiations regarding the claim” is not admissible at trial.183  The 
purpose and policy furthered by this rule is society’s interest in 
encouraging settlement of disputes outside of court.184  In fact, this policy 
 
178. See id. § 4:2, at 62 (noting disadvantage of traditional mediation is that “[t]he results 
are not binding on the parties”). 
179. See id. § 13:2–:3, :25, at 321–22, 334 (noting respectively that one result of an 
ombudsman program is to “correct patterns of undesirable practices and procedures,” that 
ombudsman can connect a complainant to a “decision-maker in the company that will be [sic] 
to settle the dispute,” and that “[o]ften organizations insist that the ombuds[man] report to 
the highest level of management in the organization”). 
180. See Kuta, supra note 12, at 391 (“[A]n [o]mbudsman provides assistance to 
individuals with problems or concerns in a neutral, non-biased manner.”). 
181. See GRENIG, supra note 22, § 4:41, at 82 (“An effective mediator suggests creative 
ways to resolve the dispute”); id. 13:1, at 318–19 (stating that an ombudsman “serves as a 
contact person for all conflicts in the organization”). 
182. FED. R. EVID. 408. 
183. Id. at 408(a)(2). 
184. Id. at 408 (advisory committee’s note declaring that the rule is intended for the 
“promotion of the public policy favoring the compromise and settlement of disputes”). 
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of encouraging the settlement of disputes outside of court has become 
increasingly prevalent in legislation more recently185 due in large part to 
today’s crowded court dockets.186 
In light of Rule 408 keeping any “conduct or statement[s] made in 
compromise negotiations” from being disclosed at trial,187 it stands to 
reason that much of what an ombudsman does on a daily basis could fit 
under this exclusion.188  Regularly, an ombudsman deals with claims 
centering on discrimination, retaliation, safety, and other employment 
related disputes that the ombudsman may attempt to conduct 
compromise negotiations between the complainant and the 
organization.189  Not only does an ombudsman’s routine function of 
conducting compromise negotiations in regard to what could otherwise 
be numerous lawsuits sensibly fit within the exclusion of Rule 408, in so 
performing his or her role an ombudsman is directly furthering the 
policy behind Rule 408 of encouraging settlement of disputes outside of 
court.190  Therefore, because the ombudsman is regularly advancing the 
policy that justifies the exclusion of conduct or statements from trial 
under Rule 408, it seems logical to exclude the conduct or statements of 
an ombudsman from trial by granting an ombudsman privilege. 
Opponents to granting an ombudsman privilege, or in fact any 
privilege, justify their argument on the old principle that “the public has 
a right to every man’s evidence.”191  While it is true that in the past in 
many cases it may have been more vital to ascertain the truth of what 
happened than further a policy or protect a confidentiality interest, 
today’s times are different.  As a result of today’s increasing court 
congestion,192 Rule 408 as well as other relatively recent pieces of 
 
185. See, e.g., Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 571–84 (2006) 
(requiring federal agencies, under section 571, to adopt policies addressing the use of 
alternative dispute resolution to settle disputes as an alternative to court). 
186. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text. 
187. FED. R. EVID. 408. 
188. See id. at 408(a).  This is true if, as Rule 408 requires, there is “a disputed claim.”  
Id.  This means that an ombudsman’s statements or conduct when assisting in compromise 
negotiations will be excluded (Rule 408 excludes statements from anyone in compromise 
negotiations, not just the parties to the dispute) from trial as long as one of the parties has a 
“claim,” and that claim is “disputed.”  Id. 
189. GRENIG, supra note 22, § 13:2, at 320. 
190. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
191. See COBBETT’S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 97. 
192. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text. 
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legislation, such as the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act,193 display 
society’s view that encouraging the settlement of disputes outside of the 
courtroom in many instances is more important than making every piece 
of evidence accessible when attempting to ascertain the truth.194  Thus, 
because the role of an ombudsman serves this policy of resolving 
disputes outside of court a privilege should be granted for 
communications with an ombudsman in order to permit ombudsmen to 
effectively resolve disputes in lieu of court.195 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 In today’s society new ways to resolve disputes in lieu of litigation 
are becoming increasingly important.  One effective way to resolve 
disagreements outside court is the implementation of an ombudsman in 
various organizations.  However, for an ombudsman to effectively 
resolve disputes the complainants need to be guaranteed that their 
communications with the ombudsman will remain confidential.  
Although courts have recently denied a privilege for communications 
with an ombudsman, the creation of such a privilege is merely the next 
logical step in furthering society’s current policy of encouraging 
settlement of conflicts outside of court.  Statistics show that an 
ombudsman can effectively resolve disputes quickly and provide 
creative settlements that would not otherwise be possible through 
litigation, but before these benefits can be fully realized, a privilege for 
communications with an ombudsman must be granted to facilitate the 
effectiveness of the ombudsman process. 
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193. 5 U.S.C. §§ 571–84 (2006) (requiring federal agencies, under section 571, to adopt 
policies addressing the use of alternative dispute resolution to settle disputes as an alternative 
to court). 
194. Wibbenmeyer, supra note 33, at 378 (“Despite the obvious need to uncover the 
truth and present relevant evidence in the search of truth, the Federal Rules of Evidence 
favor limiting the accessibility to evidence in order to encourage settlement of disputes prior 
to trial.”). 
195. See supra Part III (discussing the essential role confidentiality—which results from 
the granting of a privilege—plays in the effective functioning of an ombudsman). 
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